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suit in Pennsylvania an unreasonable burden on the defendant. Even if the
garageman had sold the tires to other Pennsylvania tourists, thereby increasing
his contacts with the state, an evaluation of the nature of his business should be
a prerequisite to allowing suit in the state. Factors such as the interest of
Pennsylvania and the foreseeability of consequences in Pennsylvania should be
weighed against compelling a small, purely local businessman to defend a suit
in a distant but foreseeable forum.
VIII. CONCLUSION
New York can be expected to push its tortious act provision to the limits
of due process. Supreme Court decisions have indicated due process is not
denied to a defendant unless it would be unfair to bring him to the forum state.
A flexible standard which will allow weighing reasonableness to subject the
defendant to the forum should therefore be adopted. Factors which should
be used to determine jurisdiction include the interest of the state, the plaintiff's
residence, the hardship to the plaintiff in bringing suit elsewhere, the nature of
the injury, and the convenience and fairness to all parties.
THE BINDING EFFECT OF A NONADVERSARY STATE
COURT DECREE IN A FEDERAL TAX
DETERMINATION
Where a federal tax statute "e-xpressly or impliedly prescribes the taxpayer's
property right as the test of taxability .. . the existence of that right [is
determined] .. .under the controlling local law."' The court, in a federal
tax proceeding, is, therefore, required to give binding effect to a prior state
decree which meets certain requirements.2 The decree3 must be final,4 deter-
1. 5 Rabkin & Johnson, Federal Income, Gift and Estate Taxation § 71.03(2) (1964).
For specific references to state law in the Internal Revenue Code fee, e.g., nt. Rev. Code
of 1954, § 2034 (dower and curtesy) ; § 2040 (joint interests); § 2053(a) (deductions allow-
able under state law); § 2053(c)(2) (definition of propcrty subject to claims); § 2056(c)
(2) (B) (marital deduction); § 2106(a)(2) (charitable deduction). See also 1 Mertens, Law
of Federal Gift and Estate Taxation § 10.01 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Mertens]. In
addition to these specific references the courts have often implied a congrezional intent
to have state law control. In determining an implied congressional intent the courts have
followed certain tests. "Among these are: that State law does not control 'unlecs the
language or necessary implication' of the revenue statutory provision so requires; . . .
whether, as to such provision, a uniform application of a nation-wide scheme of taxation
would be interfered with if State law was the criterion; ...and whether the purpo:es of
the taxing act would be avoided or defeated by applying the State law." Doll v. Commis-
sioner, 149 F.2d 239, 242 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 725 (1945).
2. See Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 35 (1934); Poe v. Scaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930);
1 Mertens, § 10.01; Sonnenschein, The Binding Effect of a State Court Decree With
Reference to Property Rights Affected by Federal Taxation, 7 Fed. BJ. 251 (1946). But !e:
Sharp v. Commissioner, 91 F.2d S02 (3d Cir. 1937), rev'd per curiam, 303 U.S. 624 (1933).
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minative of the matters upon which the tax assessment depends,5 and free from
collusion. It is with respect to this last requisite, and to the nature of a noni-
adversary decree, that the federal circuit courts cannot agree.
For example, a trust beneficiary, wishing to assign his rights to income to
his children, asks the trustee to bring an action to construe the terms of the
trust. The state court, in an uncontested suit, reaches a decision validating the
assignment. The Commissioner subsequently assesses a tax upon the income
from the trust to the father, and he appeals. The question is whether this
nonadversary decree is collusive.
Although some circuits view nonadversity as presumptively collusive,0 others,
recognizing the inequity of assessing a taxpayer on rights which he no longer
possesses because of a state decision, view nonadversity as merely evidence of
collusion.7 The controversy, therefore, resolves itself to a matter of definition.
The courts which view nonadversity as merely evidence of collusion define the
latter in its traditional sense as involving fraud.8 The courts which equate non-
adversity with collusion, however, define that term in a manner similar to that
advanced by the Commissioner in the Supreme Court case of Freuler v.
Helvering.9
The existence of a split among the circuits is due largely to the lack of
clarity in two decisions of the Supreme Court. In Freuler, a case concerning
distributable income under a trust, the definition of collusion accepted by the
majority of the circuits was advanced by the Commissioner for the first time,
i.e., "all the parties joined in a submission of the issues and sought a decision
which would adversely affect the Government's right to additional income
If the taxpayer was not a party to a state suit concerning the property right in question,
the federal court is free to make a general examination of state law. Cf. Spiegel v. Commis-
sioner, 335 U.S. 701 (1949); Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154, modified, 317 U.S. 602
(1942). For a thorough discussion of examination of state law, see 1 Mertens, §§ 10.04-.08.
Res judicata has been explicitly rejected as the reason for the binding effect of the state
court decree. The courts have placed emphasis on the injustice of taxing petitioner on rights
he did not possess or enjoy under state law. See Freuler v. Helvering, supra at 43; Colowick,
The Binding Effect of a State Court's Decision in a Subsequent Federal Income Tax Case, 12
Tax L. Rev. 213, 217 (1957).
3. The federal court should determine the jurisdiction of a state court by looking to
the relevant state statutes and prior state decisions concerning jurisdiction. See Brodrick
v. Moore, 226 F.2d 105 (10th Cir. 1955) ; Gallagher v. Smith, 223 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1955) ;
GoodAin's Estate v. Commissioner, 201 F.2d 576 (6th Cir. 1953); Tooley v. Commissioner,
121 F.2d 350 (9th Cir. 1941) ; 1 Mertens § 10.11.
4. Id. § 10.12.
5. Id. § 10.14.
6. See notes 16-21 infra and accompanying text.
7. See notes 22-34 infra and accompanying text.
8. The traditional legal definition of collusion is "an agreement between two or more
persons to defraud a person of his rights by the forms of law .... " Black, Law Dictionary
331 (4th ed. 1951).
9. 291 U.S. 35, 45 (1934).
[Vol. 33
15] COMMENTS
tax."'1 The Court found no collusion in that particular case but failed to accept
or reject the definition itself. 11 In so doing, it left to the circuit courts the
decision of whether to apply this definition or to formulate a definition of
their own.
The second case, Blair v. Commissioner,'- did little to clarify the situation.
Citing Frezder, the Court merely stated that there was no "basis for a charge
that the suit was collusive and the decree inoperative."1u A significant fact,
however, is that the Blair case was clearly nonadversary 14 and yet the state
decree was upheld on the basis
that [the state] court entertained the suit and the [state] appellate court, with the
first decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals before it, reviewed the decisions of the
Supreme Court of the State and reached a deliberate conclusion. To derogate from
the authority of that conclusion and of the decree it commanded, so far as the question
is one of state law, would be wholly unwarranted in the exercise of federal jurisdic-
tion.15
I. TnE Saulsbury RULIE
Although there is no express endorsement by the Supreme Court of the
Commissioner's definition, the majority of the circuits have chosen to adopt
the standard of Sazlsbury v. United States.,, Ignoring the facts of the Blair
case, they have applied the definition to deny the binding effect of a state
court decree merely because it is nonadversary. Saulsbnry, the leading case in
these circuits, paraphrases the Commissioner's definition as follows: "By the
word collusion, we do not mean to imply fraudulent or improper conduct, but
simply that all interested parties agreed to the order and that it was apparently
10. Id. at 45. It is interesting to note the origin of this definition of collu,.on. Before
the Board of Tax Appeals, the Commissioner suggested that the suit wvas friendly. Margucrite
T. Whitcomb, 22 B.T.A. 11S (1931), rev'd, 65 F.2d 103 (D.C. Cir. 1933). A friendly suit
is one "instituted by agreement between the parties to obtain the opinion of the court upon
some doubtful question in which they are interested." Black, Law Dictionary 795 (4th cd.
1951). The court accepted the fact that the state decree might have been friendly, but saw
no drastic consequence as a result of this since the friendly nature of the state suit did not
preclude the state tribunal from rendering an opinion which bound the parties. 22 B.T.A.
at 125. The Commissioner then turned to the definition of collusion set forth in the test.
11. 291 US. at 49.
12. 300 US. 5 (1937).
13. Id. at 10.
14. See Blair v. Commissioner, 3 F.2d 655, 657 (7th Cir. 1936), rev'd, 300 U.S. 5 (1937);
Blair v. Linn, 274 I1. App. 23 (1934).
15. 300 U.S. at 10.
16. 199 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 905 (1953). The Circuits holding
nonadversary decrees automatically ineffective are the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh,
and Tenth. See, e.g., Estate of Faulkerson v. United States, 301 F.2d 231 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. SS7 (1962); Estate of Stallworth v. Commissioner, 2M0 F.2d 7C! (5th Cir.
195S); Estate of Sweet v. Commissioner, 234 F.2d 401 (10th ir.), cert denied; 352 U.S. 378
(1956); Pitts v. Hamrick, 22S F.2d 486 (4th Cir. 1955); Channing v. Hasst, 200 F.Zd 514
(1st Cir. 1952); Kelly's Trust v. Commissioner, 163 F.2d 193 (2d Cir. 1943).
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to their advantage from a tax standpoint to do so.' '1 As a result of the express
deletion of the element of fraud from the definition of collusion, Saulsbury and
cases using the same rationale have logically concluded that a nonadversary
suit, albeit in good faith, is ineffective by its very nature.
It is submitted that this is a misinterpretation of the Supreme Court deci-
sions. The Freuler Court, pointing out that the Commissioner's definition did
not apply to the case at hand, stated: "The [state] decree purports to decide
issues regularly submitted and not to be in any sense a consent decree."' 8 Thus,
the Court seemed to indicate that it would define collusion in terms of a consent
decree, i.e., one which does not purport to represent the court's judgment but
merely records the agreement of the parties.19 Such a definition would be com-
mensurate with the rationale of Blair which requires a deliberate conclusion by
the state court.20 The consent decree definition posits acquiescence rather than
deliberation. Also, a consent decree would amount to an agreement to "adversely
affect the Government's right to additional income tax,"'2 1 and would more closely
approximate the traditional notion of collusion.
II. THE Gallagher RULE
The problem of nonadversity has been treated quite differently by the Third
Circuit.2 There the view has been taken that the nonadversity of the decree
is not sufficient to nullify the decree's binding effect, but is "evidence of
collusion."' 3 While several early cases seem to have utilized this approach,2 '2
its first notable exposition was in Gallagher v. Smith.2" The proceeding was
nonadversary 26 but the court felt that:
17. 199 F.2d at 580. (Italics omitted.)
18. 291 U.S. at 45.
19. See Carpenter v. Carpenter, 213 N.C. 36, 195 S.E. 5 (1938); Stannard Supply Co. v.
Delmar Coal Co., 110 W. Va. 560, 158 S.E. 907, (1931).
20. 300 U.S. at 10.
21. 291 U.S. at 45.
22. The Third Circuit's approach has also been employed in the Sixth, Eighth and Ninth
Circuits. See Goodwin's Estate v. Commissioner, 201 F.2d 576 (6th Cir. 1953); Estate of
Peyton v. Commissioner, 323 F.2d 438 (8th Cir. 1963); Flitcroft v. Commissioner, 328 F.2d
449 (9th Cir. 1964).
23. Gallagher v. Smith, 223 F.2d 218, 225 (3d Cir. 1955); see Flitcroft v. Commissioner,
328 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1963) ; cf. Goodwin's Estate v. Commissioner, 201 F.2d 576 (6th Cir.
1953).
24. See Goodwin's Estate v. Commissioner, 201 F.2d 576 (6th Cir. 1953), reversing 10
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1244 (1951); Eisenmenger v. Commissioner, 145 F.2d 103 (8th Cir.
1944), reversing 44 B.T.A. 489 (1941) ; Sharpe v. Commissioner, 107 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1939),
cert. denied, 309 U.S. 665 (1940) ; Bullard v. Commissioner, 90 F.2d 144 (7th Cir. 1937), rev'd
on other grounds, 303 U.S. 297 (1938) ; Janes v. Reynolds, 57 F. Supp. 609 (D. Minn. 1944).
25. 223 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1955).
26. Id. at 224-26. The beneficiary of a trust disclaimed all rights under the trust In
excess of a one-thirteenth share of the income. On an auditing and account by the Orphans'
Court of Philadelphia County, that tribunal in an admittedly nonadversary proceeding
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if the question at issue is fairly presented to the state court for its independent de-
cision .. the fact that the parties all favored the same result in the state court
is relevant only so far as it is evidence of collusion and should not in and of itself
vitiate in the federal court such conclusive effect as the state law gives to the judg-
ment with respect to the property rights determined by it. For if in the ab2ence of
fraud such a judgment does determine the rights of the parties in the property they
must thereafter live with it so far as their enjoyament of the property is concerned.2 7
The Gallagher court's position is preferable for several reasons. First, it
recognizes both the need for a deliberate conclusion by the state court and
the possibility of reaching such a conclusion in a nonadversary proceeding.
In doing so the court seems to be in accord with the Blair rationale. -" Second,
the court recognizes the injustice of taxing the petitioner with respect to
property rights which he does not possess or enjoy under state law, the under-
lying basis for the Freuler decision. -9 Third, and most importantly, the court, by
refusing to invalidate the decree on the mere fact of nonadversity, reserves the
right to make an independent examination of the presence or absence of a
collusive motive.3 0
It has been suggested that "where all the parties on one side join freely to
express their views, the [state] court is bound to believe that all the equities
are on that side," 3' and, therefore, the Commissioner will be prejudiced in the
federal tax proceeding. Although this danger exists, adherence to the Gallagh r
rule will not make the danger so prevalent as to warrant the abandonment of
a rationale which is otherwise sound. In Peyton v. Commissioncr:2 although the
federal court viewed nonadversity only as "evidence of collusion," this finding
did not preclude the court from refusing to give effect to a decree which clearly
emanated from a tax avoidance motive.3 Controlling in this determination were
confirmed the account (including the disclaimer) and awarded the balance of the income
to the testator's twelve children. The Commissioner, however, taxed the petitioner on the
entire trust income. In an action to recover the taxes paid, the federal district court held
that they were not bound by the state decree since "the proceedings in the Orphans' Court
were of a nonadversary nature" Gallagher v. Smith, 119 F. Supp. 3CO, 361 (E.D. Pa. 1953)
27. 223 F.2d at 225.
28. Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5, 10 (1937).
29. Freuler v. Helvering, 291 US. 35, 45 (1934).
30. An example of such an examination can be seen in Estate of Darlington v. Commu-
sioner, 302 F.2d 693 (3d Cir. 1962), where the court upheld the state decree, although non-
adversary, on the basis that all parties were summoned and appeared with counsel (with one
exception) ; the matter was presented in open court at regular seission; and the decree wa
binding on the parties. Id. at 695.
31. Colowick, supra note 2, at 21S. The Commissioner has also contended that acceptance
of nonadversary decrees will open the floodgates of litigation. In Lindley v. United State;
57-2 U.S. Tax Cas. i 9S93, at 531S4, 53188 (D. Minn. 1957) (memorandum decision), the
court answered that "Congress has never seen fit to exercise plenary powers in this field and
under the circumstances presented here, no good reason is made to appear why this Court
should not recognize the findings of the State Court as determinative of this matter,"
32. 323 F.2d 433 (8th Cir. 1963).
33. Id. at 446.
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the facts that counsel conferred with the judge before the final ruling, and
counsel for the estate also acted for the widow, even though the issue placed
them on opposing sides.
34
It would seem, then, that the Gallagher rule, if applied intelligently, will
prevent the taxpayer from defrauding the Government by merely entering into
a sham state proceeding. Furthermore, its use is far more equitable than the
Saulsbury rule which would "bar acceptance on some generalized definition of
collusion which automatically excludes nonadversary adjudications."2 0
III. THE EFFECT OF A STATE APPEAL
The fact that the state court adjudication was appealed from has weighed
heavily with the circuit courts, especially those adhering to the Saulsbury rule,
as evidencing a noncollusive state decree.20 This effect was explicitly sanctioned
in Kelly's Trust v. Commissioner.37 The state suit involved a clearly non-
adversary proceeding which the Tax Court felt was a "consent judgment,"2 8
and, as such, invalid. The circuit court, however, overruled the Tax Court"0
and reinstated the state court decree solely on the basis that the state judgment
had been appealed. The court reasoned that regardless of "the nature of the
state-court suit in its inception ... the fact that the appeal was considered
shows that the judgment was not by consent, for a consent judgment by its
nature precludes an appeal."'40 This "magical effect of appeal" has been criti-
cized as unfair to the Commissioner,41 but despite this it appears that the
"collusive" nature of a suit may be cured by taking an appeal.
IV. BURDEN OF PROOF
Apart from the effect to be given a state court decree in a federal tax proceed-
ing, the question of who has the burden of proving the validity, i.e., freedom
from collusion, of the state decree has generated additional problems. The
Fifth Circuit, places the burden on the taxpayer, noting that it did not "affirma-
tively appear that said order was obtained in an adversary proceeding and
that there was no collusion." '42 However, the Tenth Circuit in Brodrick v.
Gore43 rejected the Fifth Circuit view and placed the burden on the Corn-
34. Ibid.
35. 1 Mertens § 10.15, at 648-49.
36. See Estate of Faulkerson v. United States, 301 F.2d 231 (7th Cir. 1962); Brainard v.
Commissioner, 91 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1937), appeal dismissed mem., 303 U.S. 665 (1938);
Second Nat'l Bank v. United States, 222 F. Supp. 446, 456 (D. Conn. 1963); McHarg v.
Fitzpatrick, 45 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1028 (D. Conn. 1953), aff'd, 210 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1954).
37. 168 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1948).
38. Ibid.
39. Garrard E. Kelly Trust 2, 8 T.C. 1269 (1947).
40. 168 F.2d at 198-99.
41. Colowick, supra note 2, at 226.
42. Saulsbury v. United States, 199 F.2d 578, 580 (5th Cir. 1952).
43. 224 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1955).
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missioner to prove that the state decree pleaded, in the complaint, was col-
lusive." The suggestion has also been advanced that the burden of proof should
fall on the person rejecting the state decree." This, of course, would place the
burden in most cases on the Commissioner. Since a state decree is valid in the
absence of collusion,46 the last suggestion would seem the most reasonable.
V. CONCLUSION
A majority of the recent cases have utilized the Gallaghcr rule4 - which views
nonadversity as merely evidence of collusion; while in the past the Saulsbury
rule which equates a nonadversary decree with collusion had been more
popular. In this connection, it is especially noteworthy that the Ninth Circuit,
in Flitcroft zV. Commissioner,48 seems to have reversed its stand 9 and now
employs the GallUagher test5 ° In the words of the Gallagher court:
If the questions are fairly posed to the [state] court and the tribunal is left free to
decide them according to its owa independent judgment it should not be necessary
for the parties to take formal adversary positions and engage in legal shadow boxing
in order that the judgment of the court should have conclusive effect, tax-Vise as well
as propertydise. 5 1
44. Id. at 896.
45. See Helvering v. Rhodes' Estate, 117 F.2d 509 (Sth Cir. 1941); Estate of Frederick R.
Shepherd, 39 B.T.A. 38 (1939).
46. Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U-S. 35 (1934).
47. See Flitcroft v. Commissioner, 328 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1964); Estate of Peyton v.
Commissioner, 323 F.2d 438 (Sth Cir. 1963); Estate of Darlington v. Commissioner, 302 F2d
693 (3d Cir. 1962); Northwest Security Nat'l Bank v. Welsh, 203 F. Supp. 263 (D.S.D.),
appeal dismissed on stipulation, 303 F.d 367 (Sth Cir. 1962). Contra, Estate of Faulkerzon v.
United States, 301 F.2d 231 (7th Cir. 1962); Second Nat'l Bank v. United States, 222 F. Supp.
446 (D. Conn. 1963). It is interesting to note that Faulkerson, while requiring an adverrary
decree, cites Gallagher in support of its position. Estate of Faulkerson v. United States, supra
at 233.
48. 328 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1964).
49. The court had previously ruled in Volfsen v. Smyth, 223 F.2d 111 (9th Cir. 1955)
and Newman v. Commissioner, 222 F.2d 131 (9th Cir. 1955), that nonadver-ary decrees were
ineffective. In Flitcroft v. Commissioner, 328 F.2d 449, 458 (9th Cir. 1964), the court
stated: "While there is language in both Newman v. Commissioner and Wolfsen v. Smyth
which supports respondent's position here, both cases are factually distinguishable from the
instant case .... !
50. "The mere fact that the action instituted by the trustees was not reisted by the
trustors ... does not in itself make the decree collusive. It is one factor to be conEidered."
328 F.2d at 455. (Footnote omitted.) Another interesting case is Parkersburg Nat'l Ban
v. United States, 228 F. Supp. 375 (N.D. W. Va. 1964), where the court limited the meaning
of "nonadversary" to reach substantially the same result as Gallagher.
51. 223 F.2d at 225. The decisions in Freuler and Blair have elicited mixed reactions,
One commentator has suggested that the state decree should have no binding effect whatso-
ever. This view would allow the state adjudication only precedential. value which could be
negated by a general examination of state law. Cardozo, Federal Taxes and the Radiating
Potencies of State Court Decisions, 51 Yale LJ. 783, 797 (1942). Another author feels that
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In Blair, the Court granted certiorari because of "an asserted conflict . . .
with decisions of circuit courts of appeals .... "5 This conflict, far from being
resolved, has become more pronounced. The Supreme Court's consistent refusal
to grant certiorari to cases involving nonadversary state decrees should end.
although the rules are at times in confusion, "there are definite guides which counsel may
look for . . . ." Colowick, supra note 2, at 235. It should be noted that Mr. Colowick is
generally critical of the Gallagher rule. See id. at 218-20.
52. Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5, 8 (1937).
